This indicator is contradictory to the prescriptions of the EU Public Procurement Directive or the Hungarian Public Procurement Law, but according to the authors is in line with a corrupt rent extraction logic, since contract awards are annulled and relaunched more often when there were multiple bidders .The indicator's value is set 0, if the contract was awarded in a non-annulled procedure and 1, if the contract was awarded in a procedure annulled, but relaunched. Both annulations by the procuring entities or courts are taken into consideration.
Not publishing the call for tenders in the official journal increases the probability of single received and valid bids and the winner’s contract share in every regression. Therefore the indicator's value is set 0, if the call for tender was published in official journal and 1, if no call for tender was published in official journal
Modifying call for tenders allows for excluding unwanted bidders by changing eligibility criteria once the interested bidders are known. Therefore the indicator's value is set 0, if call for tenders are NOT modified and 1, if call for tenders are modified.
According to the developers of CRI, contract lengthening suggests that the issuer corruptly favour a well-connected company, potentially repeatedly. This indicator contains a relative figure that shows relative contract extension (days of extension/days of contract length).
According to the developers of CRI, contract modification(s) suggests that the procuring entity corruptly favour a well-connected company, potentially repeatedly. Therefore the indicator's values is set 0 if the contract was not modified during delivery and 1, if the contract was modified during delivery.
According to the developers of CRI, contract value increase suggests that the issuer corruptly favour a well-connected company, potentially repeatedly. This indicator also contains a relative figure that shows relative contract price increase (change in contract value/original, contracted contract value). CRCB provides no further clarifications on the indicator, besides statistical data on validation.
Exceptionally short decision periods may indicate rushed through decisions and the corresponding high corruption risks. Exceptionally long decision periods, however may signal multiple legal challenges and troubled decision making hence high corruption risk. The indicator takes into comsideration the number of working days between submission deadline and announcing contract award.
Every non-open procedure type carries a higher corruption risk than open procedures in terms of single received and valid bids and winner’s contract share. Therefore developers set the indicator's value 0 , if there is ano open procedure, 1, if there is an invitation procedure, 2, if there is a negotiation procedure, and 3, if there are other procedures (e.g. competitive dialogue). Indicator's value is 4, if procedure type is missing/erroneous.
Relatively expensive tender documentation makes bidding more expensive and hence deters bidders from bidding except for the wellconnected company which is close to certain of its succes. This is a ratio-indicator calculated between the price of tender documentation/contract value.
Single received bid contracts make it easier for issuers to repeatedly award contracts to the same well-connected company. The indicator's value is set 0 if more than one bid received and 1, if one bid received