Indicators /
contract value increase

label Identifier Identifier
78
power_settings_new State State
Active
flag Autonomy Autonomy
Element of composite index
description Description Description
According to the developers of CRI, contract value increase suggests that the issuer corruptly favour a well-connected company, potentially repeatedly. This indicator also contains a relative figure that shows relative contract price increase (change in contract value/original, contracted contract value). CRCB provides no further clarifications on the indicator, besides statistical data on validation.
location_on Country Country
Hungary
language Language Language
Hungarian
link Link to project Link to project
http://tendertracking.eu/about
face Developer Developer
Corruption Research Center Budapest
code Programming language Programming language
today Development date Development date
link Link to source code Link to source code
N/A
library_books Where to extract data from Where to extract data from
CRCB uses its own dataset for the index (partially available at tendertracking.eu). Data contains of public procurement procedures conducted under Hungarian Public Procurement. Variables appear in 1) calls for tenders; 2) contract award notices; 3) contract modification notices; 4) contract completion announcements; 5) administrative corrections notices.
linear_scale Process phase Process phase
IMPLEMENTATION
verified_user Validation Validation
Validated
verified_user Validation method Validation method
the indicator is partially validated. the developers only set forth possible ways of validation of CRI, but according to their own assessment, it takes several years to validate the aforementioned indicators on a whole scale. These elementary validation routes, however, are important as follows:
1. analysis of cross-sectional and time-series distribution of CRI
2. relationship between the amount of spending not reported in the PP database and CRI on the organisational level
3. analysis of profitability and turnover growth of winning firms with different CRI
4. political control of winning companies is collated with their CRI
5. comparison of average CRI of "crony companies" with those whose success is largely unaffected by government change.
folder_open Tags Tags
abuse of contract changes and amendments
algorithmic
input indicator
numeric indicator
price
process rigging